In delayed matching to sample, once acquired, pigeons presumably choose comparisons according to their memory for (the strength of) the sample. When memory for the sample is sufficiently weak, comparison choice should depend on the history of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli. In the present research, pigeons acquired two matching tasks in which Sample S1 was associated with one comparison from each task, C1 and C3, whereas Sample S2 was associated with Comparison C2, and Sample S3 was associated with Comparison C4. As the retention interval increased, the pigeons showed a bias to choose the comparison (C1 or C3) associated with the more frequently occurring sample (S1). Thus, pigeons were sensitive also to the (irrelevant) likelihood that each of the samples was presented. The results suggest that pigeons may allow their reference memory for the overall sample frequency to influence comparison choice, independent of the comparison stimuli present.
Memory in animals has been studied using a variety of tasks involving a delayed response. One of the most useful tools in the assessment of memory mechanisms in pigeons has been the conditional discrimination (e.g., matching to sample). In matching-tosample, the identity of the initial or sample stimulus indicates which of two (or more) test or comparison stimuli is correct (Skinner, 1950) . According to Hartl and Fantino (1996) , in a matching task, comparison choice for pigeons should depend on two factors, the relative probabilities of reinforcement associated with the comparisons and the conditional probability of each comparison being correct given presentation of one of the samples.
In the absence of a sample, the probability of each of two comparisons being correct is typically 50%. Presentation of the sample provides additional information, to the degree that the identity of the sample increases the probability of reinforcement for selecting one comparison over the other. In a typical matching task, the probability increases from 50% without the sample, potentially, to 100% with the sample. Thus, assuming that the comparison stimuli are correct equally often over trials and that the probability of reinforcement is the same for a correct response to each comparison, as an increasingly long retention interval is inserted between the offset of the sample and the onset of the comparisons, one would expect that the slopes of the pigeons' retention functions for trials involving each of the samples would be quite similar (see Grant, 1991; White & Wixted, 1999) . That is, the retention functions should decline at about the same rate to a level of about 50% correct (chance performance). Thus, according to White and Wixted (1999) , in the absence of sample memory, pigeons should choose comparisons on the basis of the relative probability with which they had been reinforced in training.
Alternatively, in the absence of sample memory, pigeons might use the prior probability of sample presentation as the basis for comparison choice. In most cases, however, the probability of reinforcement for comparison choice and the probability of sample presentation are the same (50%). One can partially dissociate the identity of the sample and the probability of reinforcement for comparison choice by manipulating the ratio of sample frequencies and the differential probability of reinforcement for choices of the matching comparison (see Goodie & Fantino, 1995 , for the results of such manipulations with humans). Alternatively, one could introduce a second matching task that involves two new comparison stimuli and one new sample but shares the other sample with the first matching task. Thus, there would be three rather than four samples, and the frequency of presentation of one sample would be twice that of each of the other two. Given the presentation of a pair of comparisons, however, the probability that it had been preceded by one of the two possible samples would be equal.
In the present experiment, we asked how pigeons would estimate the probability of a correct comparison response when the sample probabilities were different from the probability of reinforcement for choice of each of the comparison stimuli. To manipulate the relative frequency of sample (S) presentation while maintaining equal probability of reinforcement for comparison (C) choice, we trained pigeons on two 2-sample-2-comparison matching tasks. Each matching task had a different pair of comparison stimuli, but the two tasks shared a common sample. The two tasks can be represented S1-C1, S2-C2 and S1-C3, S3-C4 (with C1 and C2 always appearing together and C3 and C4 always appearing together). If each of the four trial types appeared equally often, each of the comparison stimuli would be associated with reinforcement on 25% of the reinforced trials. However, the same would not be true of the samples. S2 and S3 would each be presented on 25% of the trials, whereas S1 would be presented on 50% of the trials.
Under conditions with no delay, one would expect a high level of matching accuracy and no comparison bias. However, one can increase errors by inserting a delay between the offset of the sample and the onset of the comparisons. If comparison choice depends on the probability of reinforcement associated with those choices, no bias should appear. As sample strength declines, correct choice of the comparisons in both tasks should decline at a similar rate, approaching 50% correct.
Alternatively, however, as sample strength on the present trial fades, pigeons may estimate the likelihood that each of the samples had been presented (i.e., they may consult their reference memory for the overall probability of sample presentation). Thus, they may dissociate the actual probability of reinforcement associated with each comparison choice from sample presentation. If they did consult reference memory, they would access more instances of S1 than instances of either S2 or S3, and they would thus likely show a bias to choose C1 and C3.
Method

Subjects
The subjects were 8 White Carneaux pigeons (Columba livia), purchased as retired breeders (5-8 years old) from the Palmetto Pigeon Plant (Sumter, SC). The pigeons were maintained at 80% of their free-feeding body weights throughout the experiment and were caged individually with grit and water continually available in the home cage. The colony room in which the pigeons were housed was maintained on a 12-hr light/12-hr dark cycle. All pigeons had previously served in an unrelated study involving simple simultaneous discriminations.
Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a standard BRS/LVE (Laurel, MD) sound attenuating pigeon test chamber. Three rectangular response keys (2.5 cm high ϫ 3 cm wide) were separated from each other by 1 cm and were aligned horizontally and centered on the response panel. Mounted behind each response key was a 12-stimulus inline projector (Industrial Electronics Engineering, Series 10, Van Nuys, CA, with No. 1820 GE lamps) that could project a red hue (Kodak Wratten Filter No. 26, Rochester, NY) or a green hue (Kodak Wratten Filter No. 60 ) onto any of the three response keys or a plain white field (no filter) onto the center response key. In addition, the left and right projectors could project a white circle (an annulus with 16-mm outside diameter and 13-mm inside diameter) and a white dot (5 mm in diameter). A houselight located at the center of the chamber ceiling provided general illumination. A rear-mounted grain feeder was centered horizontally on the response panel midway between the pecking keys and the floor of the chamber. When operated, the feeder was accessible through a 5.0 cm ϫ 5.5 cm lit aperture in the response panel. Reinforcement consisted of 2-s access to Purina Pro Grains (St. Louis, MO). White noise and an exhaust fan mounted on the outside of the chamber masked extraneous noise. The experiment was controlled by a microcomputer located in an adjacent room.
Procedure
Training. All pigeons were placed directly on 0-s-delay matching-tosample training. At the beginning of each trial, the center key (sample) was illuminated. Following 10 responses to the sample, the sample was turned off, and the side (comparison) keys were illuminated. Comparison stimuli were presented randomly with respect to location, with the restriction that a particular hue could not occur on the same side key for more than three consecutive trials. One response to either comparison constituted a choice and terminated the trial. Correct comparison responses resulted in a 2-s presentation of food and a 10-s intertrial interval. Incorrect choices resulted in the 10-s intertrial interval alone.
For each pigeon, training consisted of a hybrid matching task involving three sample stimuli (one per trial) and two pairs of comparison stimuli (one pair on each trial). On one fourth of the trials, one of the hues (S1) served as the sample with red and green comparison stimuli on the side keys and for example, red was correct. On another fourth of the trials, the same hue was the sample with circle and dot comparison stimuli and for example, circle was correct. On another fourth of the trials, a second hue (S2) was the sample, the comparison stimuli were red and green, and green was correct. On the remaining fourth of the trials, the third hue (S3) was the sample, the comparison stimuli were circle and dot, and dot was correct.
The three sample hues-red, green, and white-were counterbalanced such that each hue served as the one-to-many sample for 2-3 pigeons, and each of the remaining samples was associated with the hue comparisons for at least 1 pigeon. Sessions consisted of 96 trials and were conducted 6 days a week. For each pigeon, criterion was met when the correct comparison for each trial type was chosen on at least 90% of those trials, for two consecutive sessions. Following criterion performance, each pigeon received five sessions of overtraining to ensure stability of matching accuracy.
Retention test. On the following session, each pigeon was transferred to a mixed-delay matching procedure in which the offset of the sample was separated from the onset of the side keys by a dark retention interval of 0, 2, 4, or 8 s. For each of the trial types, there was an equal number of trials involving each retention interval. The retention test consisted of two sessions. The reinforcement contingencies were the same as they were during training. In all analyses of results, the .05 level of statistical significance was adopted.
Results
Training
Sessions to criterion (two successive sessions at 90% correct or higher) for S1 trials was 13.6 when the comparisons were hues and 13.8 when the comparisons were shapes. Sessions to criterion for S2 and S3 trials was 10.2 when the comparisons were hues and 11.1 when the comparisons were shapes. Thus, acquisition of the trial types involving the more frequently presented sample appeared to be somewhat slower than was acquisition of the trial types involving the less frequently presented samples. A mixedeffect analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed on the acquisition scores with task component (S1 vs. S2 and S3 trials) and comparison dimension (hues vs. shapes) as factors indicated that neither main effect nor the interaction was statistically reliable, F(1, 7) ϭ 2.08, F Ͼ1, and F Ͼ1, respectively.
Retention Test
The retention data were pooled over the two test sessions and subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA with task component (S1 vs. S2 and S3 trials) and delay (0, 2, 4, and 8 s) as factors. The ANOVA indicted that there was a significant Task Component ϫ Delay interaction, F(3, 21) ϭ 4.37, and there was a significant effect of delay, F(3, 21) ϭ 44.01. The effect of task component was not quite significant, F(1, 7) ϭ 4.79. The retention data are presented in Figure 1 .
Examination of Figure 1 indicates that matching accuracy declined more gradually with increasing delay when the sample was S1 than when the sample was S2 or S3. The fact that matching accuracy declined below chance (although not significantly so) on S2 and S3 trials and that matching accuracy on S1 trials appeared to level off at almost 70% correct (clearly not approaching chance) suggests that the pigeons were biased to select the two comparisons associated with correct responding when the sample was S1 relative to the two comparisons associated with correct responding when the samples were S2 and S3.
Discussion
According to traditional views of matching (i.e., Hartl & Fantino, 1996) , the probability of a comparison choice should be determined by the conditional probability associated with each comparison, given the sample or, if the identity of the sample is not available, by the probability of reinforcement associated with each comparison (independently of the sample). Thus, the choice of a particular comparison (e.g., C1) should depend on both the relative number of reinforced sample-comparison pairings (e.g., S1-C1) and the relative number of reinforcements associated with that comparison (Wixted, 1993) .
In the present experiment, both the conditional probability of reinforcement associated with each of the comparisons, given one of the samples, and the probability of reinforcement associated with choice of either comparison, independent of the sample, were equal. Thus, delay-induced loss of sample strength should have had a symmetrical effect on comparison choice. However, we found significantly divergent retention functions. Thus, these results require the modification of current theories of delayed conditional discrimination performance (e.g., White & Wixted, 1999) . Some modification of current theories is needed, as pigeons' choice behavior was influenced not only by the probability of reinforcement associated with responding to each of the comparison stimuli and by the conditional probabilities associated with choice of the comparison stimuli as a function of sample availability but also by the relative frequency of each of the samples. When delays are introduced, as the delay increases, pigeons demonstrate an increasing tendency to select the comparison associated with the more frequently presented sample (S1), even though that sample was not presented more often in the context of either comparison pair than was the alternative sample. It is as if, on trials when the sample is unavailable, presentation of the comparisons causes the pigeons to consult their reference memory for the overall probability of sample presentation (independent of the comparison pair), and they use those probabilities to choose between the comparisons.
The use of reference memory to estimate sample probability, independently of reinforcement associated with each of the comparisons, in fact may be a general phenomenon in matching performance by pigeons. But evidence of this process may be apparent only when the probability of occurrence of each sample is different from the probability of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli (in most matching experiments, sample probability and probability of reinforcement for comparison choice are the same). Furthermore, such effects may appear only under conditions such as those of the present experiment, which are sensitive enough to detect sample frequency effects (because the probability of reinforcement for each comparison choice is equal).
Alternative Accounts of the Divergent Retention Functions
There are two alternative interpretations of the present results. The first involves differential effects of training on the three different samples. Although the pigeons had equal opportunity to acquire each of the four sample-comparison associations, the more frequent presentations of S1 could have allowed it to be more efficiently coded, better maintained, or more easily retrieved. That is, at the time of comparison choice, when the S1 stimulus had been the sample, it may have been more accessible than either the S2 or S3 stimuli were when they had been the sample. However, there are two reasons to suspect that such an interpretation is inadequate to account for the present results. First, if there was more efficient processing of the more frequent sample, one would have expected the sample-comparison associations involving that sample to have been acquired more rapidly. Instead, it was the S2 and S3 sample-comparison associations that were acquired faster (although not significantly so). Second, if the difference in slope of the retention functions was attributable to differences in sample accessibility at the time the comparisons were presented, both the S1 and the S2-S3 functions should have approached 50% correct with increasing retention interval. Instead, the S1 retention function appeared to level off, while the S2-S3 retention function declined below chance at delays of 4 and 8 s. Such retention functions suggest that rather than better retrieval of the S1 sample, the pigeons have developed a bias to choose the comparison associated with the more frequently presented sample.
A second alternative interpretation of the present data involves the possibility that there is differential, proactive, between-trials interference on test trials. Specifically, the probability that the prior trial involved S1 is 50%, whereas the probability that the prior trial involved S2 or S3 is 25% for each one. One can assume that if the sample on the present trial is the same as the sample on the prior trial, facilitation will result. However, if the sample on the present trial is different from the sample on the prior trial, whether interference occurs may depend on whether the correct comparison Figure 1 . Retention functions following training in which Sample S1 was associated with correct choice of one comparison, C1, when the comparisons were C1 and C2, and another comparison when the comparisons were C3 and C4. Sample S2 was associated with correct choice of Comparison C2 when the comparisons were C1 and C2, and Sample S3 was associated with correct choice of Comparison C4 when the comparisons were C3 and C4.
associated with the prior sample is available on the present trial. Thus, if the sample on the prior trial is S2 and the sample on the present trial is S3, one might predict that there would be neither facilitation nor interference because the comparison stimulus associated with correct choice on the prior trial would not be present on the present trial. Finally, if the correct comparison associated with the prior sample is available but is incorrect on the present trial, one would expect interference.
Thus, if the present sample is S1, there is a 50% probability that the sample from the prior trial will facilitate matching accuracy, a 25% probability that the sample from the prior trial will be neutral, and a 25% probability that the sample from the prior trial will interfere with matching accuracy. If the sample is either S2 or S3, however, there is a 50% probability that the sample from the prior trial will interfere, a 25% probability that the sample from the prior trial will be neutral, and a 25% probability that the sample from the prior trial will facilitate matching accuracy. This means the probability that the prior trial will facilitate matching accuracy is higher on S1 trials than on S2 and S3 trials, whereas the probability that the prior trial will interfere with matching accuracy is higher on S2 and S3 trials.
Although differential interference and facilitation are potentially present, it should be noted that between-trials interference effects reported following matching-to-sample training generally have been quite small (Roberts, 1980) . Furthermore, if the differences in matching accuracy found between S1 trials and S2-S3 trials resulted from the relatively small differential proportion of facilitative versus interfering prior trials, the magnitude of facilitation and interference on each trial would have to be extremely large, especially on trials with a relatively long retention interval. Specifically, the 21.7% difference in matching accuracy at the 8-s delay would have to result from the effects of one out of four S1 and S2-S3 trials. Thus, the difference in matching accuracy between a facilitation and an interference trial would have to be about four times the S1/ S2-S3 trial difference found, or about 86.8%.
The above analysis is, of course, hypothetical. To more directly test for the effects of a prior stimulus, we separated the test trials into three categories: trials preceded by a trial that should facilitate matching accuracy (e.g., an S1 trial followed by another S1 trial), trials preceded by a trial that should be relatively neutral with respect to matching accuracy (e.g., an S2 trial followed by an S3 trial), and trials preceded by a trial that should interfere with matching accuracy (e.g., an S1 trial followed by an S2 trial). Overall matching accuracy on trials preceded by a trial that should facilitate matching accuracy (66% correct), that should be relatively neutral with regard to matching accuracy (71% correct), and that should interfere with matching accuracy (67%) did not differ significantly, F(2, 14) ϭ 1.06. Furthermore, they were not even ordered as would be predicted by intertrial proactive effects. Thus, it appears that the effect of the prior trial on matching accuracy was negligible, and it certainly cannot account for the differences in matching accuracy that appear in Figure 1 . The most parsimonious account of the present results is that memory for the overall frequency of the samples has an important effect on comparison choice, independent of its mediated association with reinforcement through the correct comparison.
Probability Estimation in Humans
The present results may be analogous to a well-studied phenomenon found in research on probability estimation in humans. Under certain conditions, humans are known to reliably overestimate the probabilities of events, even though there is sufficient information provided to arrive at the correct probability (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) .
In a common version of the problem, originally proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1980) , participants are told that patients presenting with a particular set of symptoms have a 10% chance of having contracted a particular disease. Furthermore, they are told that there exists a diagnostic test, the accuracy of which is 80% (in detecting the disease when it is present and in correctly indicating that the disease is absent when it is not present). Participants are then asked, "Given that the symptoms are present and the test results are positive, what is the probability that the patient has the disease?" Most participants guess that it is very likely (between 60% and 80%) that the patient has the disease. In making this judgement, the participants fail to consider sufficiently the fact that the disease is relatively rare (i.e., they tend to underestimate the effect of the base rate on the probability). In fact, the conditional probability of correctly identifying the presence of the disease is equal to the probability that the disease is present times the probability that the test is correct, which is .10 ϫ .80 ϭ .08, whereas the probability of incorrectly identifying the disease when it actually was absent is equal to the probability that the disease is absent times the probability that the test is incorrect, which is .90 ϫ .20 ϭ .18. This means that the probability of being correct given a positive test is only .08/(.08 ϩ .18) ϭ .31, or less than one chance in three. Thus, humans generally overestimate the likelihood that the disease is present because they underestimate the base rate. Similarly, the relative neglect of base rate is responsible for the exaggerated fear that people have, for example, of air travel, of walking the streets of New York City, or of their children being shot at school.
The relation between the phenomenon of base-rate neglect and the performance of our pigeons on the hybrid matching task may not be obvious, in part because the pigeon task involves errors induced by a delay and the human task does not. However, we believe that both phenomena are influenced by similar biases.
In the human task, the probability of having the disease, in the absence of information provided by the diagnostic test, is the base rate. The analogous component in the matching task is the probability associated with comparison choice in the absence of information provided by the sample.
In the human example, in the absence of the diagnostic test, the probability of a patient having the disease is low, 10%, whereas with a positive test the probability increases to 31%. The analog to the information provided by the diagnostic test in the human problem is the information provided to the pigeon by the sample. Although the actual probabilities in the human task are quite different from those in the pigeon task, the logic for the hybrid matching task with pigeons is quite similar. In the absence of the sample (or test) information, the probability of being correct is 50% (the base rate). This value was selected because any deviation from chance can be interpreted as a bias. Thus, it maximizes the probability of seeing an effect. However, given the information provided by the sample, the probability of being correct potentially increases to 100%. Approximating perfect performance in training is important to ensure that the various sample-comparison associations have been thoroughly acquired. However, on test trials, sufficient errors are necessary to ensure that a bias in the pattern in the errors can be detected. The introduction of delays on test trials results in loss of matching accuracy, and under those conditions, one can determine the pigeons' decision rule for choice of the comparisons. Our results suggest that, when sample strength is low, the birds neglect the (unbiased) base-rate information and show a bias toward responding to the S1-associated comparison stimulus.
The analogy between the present research and base-rate neglect in humans depends on the assumption that although any bias that pigeons have will be present on all trials, it will have an observable detrimental effect on matching accuracy only on trials in which sample strength is weaker than the bias. Furthermore, on trials in which sample strength is weak but not absent, pigeons will perform less accurately with a bias than without one. Thus, we propose that the choice bias actually found in the present experiment suggests that there are conditions under which pigeons too can show base-rate neglect.
